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Abstract
We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good
increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implica-
tions for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer’s
underlying preferences. We characterize those data sets which can be generated by ratio-
nal preferences exhibiting complementarities. In a model in which income results from
selling an endowment (as in general equilibrium models of exchange economies), the no-
tion is surprisingly strong and is essentially equivalent to Leontief preferences. In the
model of nominal income, the notion describes a class of preferences whose extreme cases
are Leontief and Cobb-Douglas respectively.
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1 Introduction
We study the behavioral notion of complementarity in demand (which we refer to through-
out simply as complementarity): when the price of one good decreases, demand for a
complementary good increases. We deal both with the case where consumers’ nominal
income is fixed and where income is derived from selling a fixed endowment at prevailing
prices.
We obtain the full implications of complementarity both for observable demand behav-
ior (its testable implications) and for the underlying preferences. In the former exercise,
we characterize all finite sets of price-demand pairs consistent with complementarity. The
latter exercise characterizes the class of preferences generating complementarity.
The complementarity property, which we call “behavioral” to emphasize that demand,
not preference, is primitive, is a classical notion. It is the notion taught in Principles of
Economics textbooks (e.g. McAfee (2006), Stiglitz and Walsh (2003) and Krugman and
Wells (2006)) and Intermediate Microeconomics textbooks (e.g. Nicholson and Snyder
(2006), Jehle and Reny (2000), and Varian (2005)). It is a crucial property in applied
work: marketing researchers test for complementarities among products they plan to
market; managers’ pricing strategy takes a special form when they market complementary
goods; regulatory agencies are interested in complements for their potential impact on
competitive practices; complementarity is relevant for decisions on environmental policies;
complementary goods receive a special treatment in the construction of price indexes;
complementary export goods are important in standard models of international trade,
etc. etc. The literature on applications of complementarity is too large to review here.
Yet, the notion discussed here has received surprisingly little theoretical attention.
The general testable implications of complementarity were, until now, unknown. In
many applications, one needs to decide empirically whether two goods are complements.
Hence, a test which can falsify complementarity is both useful and important. Empirical
researchers’ tests typically estimate cross-partial elasticities in highly parametric models.
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However, such an exercise actually jointly tests several hypotheses. In contrast, we elicit
the complete testable implications of complementarity in a general framework.
We consider two models: a model in which consumers carry endowments and form
their demand as a function of prices and the income derived from selling endowment, and
a model in which consumers are simply endowed with a nominal income. In the nominal-
income model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for expenditure data to be
consistent with the rational maximization of a preference which exhibits complementarity
in demand. In the income-from-endowment model, complementarity is equivalent to all
demanded bundles lying on a continuous monotone path.
We also characterize the class of preferences that generate complementarity. Again
the results depend on the model under consideration. In the nominal-income model, com-
plementarity effectively requires that demand be monotonic with respect to set inclusion
of budgets (and hence normal). In this model, the class is characterized by a bound on
the percentage change in the marginal rate of substitution with respect to a change in
either commodity. Cobb-Douglas preferences are exactly those preferences meeting this
bound. In fact, complementarity in this model automatically implies rationalizability
by an upper semicontinuous utility function–a consequence of the continuity of demand
(which is also an implication of complementarity).
However, when income obtains from selling an endowment, we obtain a sharper result.
If for each endowment and price, there exists some other price for which consumption of
the two goods move weakly in the same direction, then the preferences are “generalized”
Leontief. Hence, the only preferences exhibiting global demand complementarity for all
endowments are preferences featuring “perfect complements.” This property may speak
to the fact that most canonical examples of complementary goods (coffee and sugar, gin
and tonic, etc.) are chosen in fixed proportions.
Our results are for demand for two goods. Complementarity is always a statement
about pairs of goods, so ours is in a sense the canonical setup, and the most relevant
from the viewpoint of conceptually sorting out the right notion of complementarity. We
imagine our results being used after aggregating appropriately (as in Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2003)), or conditional on demand for other goods being constant. In any
case, testing for all goods being complementary makes little sense, so some degree of
aggregation or conditioning seems unavoidable.
1.1 Discussion of results.
We illustrate and discuss graphically some of our results. See Section 2 for the formal
statements.
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(a) Complementarities.
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(b) Demands x and x′ at prices
p and p′.
Figure 1: When is observed demand consistent with complementarity?.
Consider Figure 1(a), which depicts a hypothetical observation of demand x = (x1, x2)
at prices p = (p1, p2). Figure 1(a) illustrates the notion of complementarity: goods 1 and
2 are complements if, when we decrease the price of one good, demand for the other good
increases. In the figure, complementarity require that demand at the dotted budget line
involves more of both goods. Note that we are assuming no Giffen goods, which is implied
by normal demand. Symmetrically, a decrease in the price of good 2 would also imply a
larger demanded bundle.
Given Figure 1(a), one may think that the testable implications of complementarity
amount to verifying that, whenever one finds two budgets like the ones in the figure, one
demand is always higher than the other. Consider then Figure 1(b), where one budget
is not larger than another. Are the observed demands of x at prices p, and x′ at p′,
consistent with demand complementarity? The answer is negative, as can be seen from
Figure 2(a): the larger budget drawn with a dotted line is obtained from either of the
p or p′ budgets by making exactly one good cheaper. So it would need to generate a
demand larger than both x and x′, which is not possible.
Figure 2(b) shows a condition on x and x′ which is necessary for complementarity:
the pointwise maximum of demands, x ∨ x′, must be affordable for any budget larger
than the p and p′ budgets. Since there is a smallest larger budget, the least upper bound
on the space of budgets (the dotted-line budget), we need x ∨ x′ to be affordable at the
least upper bound of the p and p′ budgets.
Since demand is homogeneous of degree zero, we can normalize prices and incomes
so that income is 1. Then the least upper bound of the p and p′ budgets is the budget
obtained with income 1 and prices p ∧ p′, the component-wise minimum price. The
necessary condition in Figure 2(b) is that (x ∨ x′) · (p ∧ p′) ≤ 1.
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(d) Violation of WARP.
Figure 2: Observed demands.
4
ωp
x = ω′
(a)
p
(b)
Figure 3: Complementarity implies Leontief preferences.
There is a second necessary condition. Consider the observed demands in Figure 2(c).
This a situation where, when we go from p to p′, demand for the good that gets cheaper
decreases while demand for the good that gets more expensive increases. This is not
in itself a violation of either complementarity or the absence of Giffen goods. However,
consider Figure 2(d): were we to increase the budget from p to the dotted prices, comple-
mentarity would imply a demand at the dotted prices that is larger than x. But no point
in the dotted budget line is both larger than x and satisfies the weak axiom of revealed
preference (WARP) with respect to the choice of x′.
So a simultaneous increase in one price and decrease in another cannot yield opposite
changes in demand. This property is a strengthening of WARP: Fix p, p′ and x as
in Figure 2(c). Then WARP requires that x′ not lie below the point where the p and
p′ budget lines cross. Our property requires that x′ not lie below the point where the
horizontal dotted line crosses the p′ budget, or that demand for good 1 not be smaller in
x′ than in x.
We show (Theorem 1 of Section 2) that the two necessary properties, the (x ∨ x′) ·
(p ∧ p′) property in Figure 2(b) and the strengthening of WARP, are also sufficient for
a complementary demand. That is: given a finite collection of observed demands x at
prices p, these could come from a demand function for complementary goods if and only if
any pair of observations satisfies the two properties. Thus, the two properties constitute
a non-parametric test for complementary goods, in the spirit of the revealed-preference
tests of Samuelson (1947) and Afriat (1967).1
We now turn to a geometric intuition for one of our results on preferences. Suppose
that prices affect incomes—a consumer obtains her income from selling an endowment ω
1See Varian (1982) for an exposition and further results. Matzkin (1991) and Forges and Minelli
(2006) discuss more general sets of data.
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of goods at the prevailing prices. Consider Figure 3(a), which shows demand x at prices p
and endowment ω, i.e. income is p ·ω. We shall describe the consumer’s indifference curve
at x. Note that demand does not change if we set the endowment to be ω ′ = x. Consider
the dotted prices in Figure 3(a). Demand at these prices cannot be to the left of x because
it would violate WARP, and demand to the right of x would violate complementarity,
as it would demand less of the good complementary to the good whose price decreased.
But then demand has to be x at the dotted prices. By repeating this argument for all
prices, Figure 3(b), we conclude that the only indifference curve supported by all prices
at x is the one obtained from Leontief preferences.
Our result is in fact stronger than the previous argument suggests. We show (The-
orem 4 of Section 2) that if, for every endowment, there is one price change for which
demand of both goods move in the same direction, then preferences must have a Leontief
form.
1.2 Historical Notes.
Before proceeding, we discuss briefly the history of the theory of complementary goods
(as revealed by preference). Much of this discussion is borrowed from Samuelson (1974),
which serves as an excellent introduction to the topic.
Perhaps the first notion of complementary goods is that formulated by Edgeworth
and Pareto on introspective grounds (Samuelson, 1974). They believed that if two goods
were complementary, then the marginal utility of an extra unit of each should be greater
than the sum of the marginal utilities of an extra unit of either. In other words, the
marginal utility of the consumption of either good should be increasing in the consump-
tion of the other good; the utility function should have nonnegative cross-derivatives.
This is an intuitively appealing definition based on preferences, not behavior; however,
it clearly depends on cardinal utility comparisons. Hicks and Allen (1934), Hicks (1939)
and Samuelson (1947) recognized this, and suggested that as a local measure of comple-
mentarity, it was useless. At any given consumption bundle, any utility function can be
transformed to have nonnegative cross-derivatives. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) estab-
lished that, despite not being an ordinal notion, the Edgeworth Pareto definition does
in fact have ordinal implications. Chambers and Echenique (2007) on the other hand,
showed that if the notion has any implications for observable demand data, they can only
be tested with an infinite set of data.
Most of the modern notions build on the increasing marginal utility notion, using
some cardinal function. For example, the notion discussed by Hicks and Allen notion for
three goods works as follows. Consider some bundle
(
x, y, t
)
. Now, define a function
T (x, y) =
{
t : U (x, y, t) = U
(
x, y, t
)}
. Then the first two goods are complements if and
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only if
∂2
∂x∂y
(−T (x, y)) ≥ 0.
In particular, if u (x, y, t) = U (x, y) + t, then goods one and two are complementary if
and only if U has nonnegative cross derivatives. (Samuelson, p. 1270). Samuelson goes a
bit further, suggesting that complementarity be defined with respect to a particular car-
dinalization of preference. His proposal is to use either McKenzie’s money-metric utility
function, or a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index for expected utility maximizers.
We now discuss the main objection to the behavioral notion of complementarity we
have studied, as well as the Hicks-Allen theory proposed to rectify it. While our notion,
sometimes called “gross complementarities,” is both natural and commonly understood,
there are other such notions. The primary criticism of our definition is that it can be
“asymmetric” in a sense. It is possible that raising the price of good one leads to an
increase in consumption of good two, while raising the price of good two leads to a
decrease in consumption of good one. This asymmetry led Hicks (1939) and other early
researchers to take interest in other notions (although they never claimed the notion we
discuss was incorrect). Hicks and Allen (1934) developed a theory of complementarity
of demand based on compensated price changes. The type of price change considered by
Hicks is the following. The price of good one is increased and the income of the agent
is simultaneously increased just enough to leave the consumer on the same indifference
curve. Good one is complementary to good two if a compensated increase in the price of
good two leads to a lower consumption of good one. Indeed, Hicksian demand is usually
understood as an expenditure minimizing bundle attaining a certain level of utility. It is
well-known that with such a definition, good one is complementary to good two if and
only if good two is complementary to good one.
Samuelson suggests that Hicks’ notion only real defense is the fact that it is not
susceptible to the same “criticisms” that earlier definitions are (Samuelson (1974) p.
1284). Ostensibly, the reason for studying compensated price changes is to provide a
single-dimensional measure of complementarity of any pair of goods. Implicit in this
approach is the notion that all goods must be either complements or substitutes. While a
single-dimensional measure of complementarity is certainly interesting, we believe there
is also room for the study of other concepts (perhaps leading to other, less decisive,
measures of complementarity).
Further, the Hicks definition can also be “criticized”: in the case of two commodi-
ties (which is the case under consideration here), all goods are economic substitutes by
necessity. This is a consequence of downward sloping indifference curves–requiring both
goods to be complements essentially results in generalized Leontief preferences. Thus, the
definition does not allow for a meaningful study of complementarity in what is arguably
the most natural framework for discussing the concept. In contrast, with our definition
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(in the nominal income model), goods are both complements and substitutes if and only
if preferences are Cobb-Douglas.
Finally, compensated price changes present a challenge from the empirical perspective
we adopt in this paper: compensated demand changes are unlikely to be observed in
real data. In other words, it is unclear what observable phenomena in the real world
correspond to compensated price changes. The notion of complementarity we adopt is
the only purely behavioral notion.
To sum up, we study the standard textbook-notion of complementarity of demand.
We avoid the criticism of asymmetry simply by specifying from the outset that two goods
are complementary if a change in price in either good leads to consumption changing in
the same direction for both goods.
2 Statement of Results
We discuss complementarity in two different contexts: first we study changes in price
when nominal income is fixed, and second, when an endowment of goods is fixed. In
the latter environment, price changes affect income, as income results from selling the
endowment at prevailing prices. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 are for the nominal income model,
D(p, I). Theorem 4 is for the endowment model. The proof of Theorem 1 is in Section 6;
the proof of Theorem 4 is in Section 4; the proof of Theorem 3 is in Section 5. Theorem 2
follows from lemmas 6.15 and 6.16 in Section 6.
2.1 Preliminaries
Let R2+ be the domain of consumption bundles, and R
2
++ the domain of possible prices.
We use standard notational conventions: x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi in R, for i = 1, 2; x < y if
x ≤ y and x 6= y; and x  y if xi < yi in R, for i = 1, 2. We write x · y for the inner
product x1y1 + x2y2.
A function u : R2+ ⇒ R is monotone increasing if x ≤ y implies u(x) ≤ u(y). It is
monotone decreasing if (−u) is monotone increasing.
A function D : R2++ × R+ → R
2
+ is a demand function if it is homogeneous of degree
0 and satisfies p ·D(p, I) = I, for all p ∈ R2++ and I ∈ R+ .
Say that a demand function satisfies complementarities if, for fixed p2 and I, p1 7→
D((p1, p2), I) is monotone decreasing, and for fixed p1 and I, p2 7→ D((p1, p2), I) is
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monotone decreasing.2
For all (p, I) ∈ R2++×R+, define the budget B (p, I) by B (p, I) =
{
x ∈ R2+ : p · x ≤ I
}
.
Note that B (p, I) is compact, by the assumption that prices are strictly positive.
A demand function D is rational if there is a monotone increasing function u : R2+ → R
such that
D (p, I) = argmaxx∈B(p,I)u(x). (1)
In that case, we say that u is a rationalization of (or that it rationalizes) D. Note that
D(p, I) is the unique maximizer of u in B(p, I).
Say that a partial demand function satisfies the the weak axiom of revealed preference
if p ·D(p′, I ′) > I whenever p′ ·D(p, I) < I ′ (with two goods, the weak axiom is equivalent
to the strong axiom of revealed preference).
2.2 Nominal Income
We shall use homogeneity to regard demand as only a function of prices: D(p, I) =
D((1/I)p, 1), so we can normalize income to 1. In this case, we regard demand as a
function D : R2++ → R
2
+ with p ·D(p) = 1 for all p ∈ R
2
++.
A partial demand function is a function D : P → R2+ where P ⊆ R
2
++ and p ·D(p) = 1
for every p ∈ P ; P is called the domain of D. So a demand function is a partial demand
function whose domain is R2++. The concept of the partial demand function allows us
to study finite demand observations. We imagine that we have observed demand at all
prices in P (see e.g. Afriat (1967), Diewert and Parkan (1983) or Varian (1982)).
Theorem 1 (Observable Demand). Let P be a finite subset of R2++ and let D : P → R
2
+
be a partial demand function. Then D is the restriction to P of a rational demand that
satisfies complementarity if and only if for every p, p′ ∈ P the following conditions are
satisfied
1. (p ∧ p′) · (D(p) ∨D(p′)) ≤ 1.
2. If p′ · D(p) ≤ 1 and p′i > pi for some product i ∈ {1, 2} then D(p
′)j ≥ D(p)j for
j 6= i.
The following theorem gives several topological implications of rationalizability.
2This is equivalent to the notion that if p′ ≤ p, then D (p) ≤ D (p′). Formally, we may require the
weaker statement that D2 ((p1, p2) , I) is weakly monotone decreasing in p1 and that D1 ((p1, p2) , I) is
weakly monotone decreasing in p2. That is, none of our results would change if we allowed for the
theoretical possibility of Giffen goods (they will be ruled out anyhow).
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Theorem 2 (Continuity). Let D : R2++ → R
2
+ be a rationalizable demand function which
satisfies complementarity. Then D is continuous. Furthermore, D is rationalized by an
upper semicontinuous, weakly monotonic utility function.
Theorem 3 requires demand to be rationalized by a twice continuously differentiable
(C2) function u. We write
m(x) =
∂u(x)/∂x1
∂u(x)/∂x2
to denote the marginal rate of substitution of u at an interior point x.
Theorem 3 (Smooth Utility). Let D be a rational demand function with interior range
and a monotone increasing, C2, and strictly quasiconvex rationalization u. Then D
satisfies complementarity if and only if the marginal rate of substitution m associated to
u satisfies that
∂m(x)/∂x1
m(x)
≤
−1
x1
and
∂m(x)/∂x2
m(x)
≥
1
x2
2.3 Endowment Model.
We also study what happens when income results from selling an endowment ω ∈ R2+ at
prices p. In this case, I = p ·ω and demand is therefore given by D(p, p ·ω). Importantly,
a change in prices implies a corresponding change in income.
In this model, D satisfies complementarity if, for all (p, ω) and all p′,
[D1(p
′, p′ · ω)−D1(p, p · ω)] [D2(p
′, p′ · ω′)−D2(p, p · ω)] ≥ 0. (2)
A substantially weaker property will be of interest: A demand function D satisfies
weak complementarity if, for every (p, ω) there is at least one price p′ 6= p satisfying (2).3
Theorem 4 (Endowment Model). Let D be a rational demand function with a continuous
and monotone increasing rationalization. Then, in the endowment model, the following
are equivalent:
1. D satisfies complementarity.
2. D satisfies weak complementarity.
3. There exist continuous strictly monotone functions fi : R+ → R∪{∞}, i = 1, 2, at
least one of which is everywhere real valued (fi (R+) ⊆ R), so that
u(x) = min {f1(x1), f2(x2)}
is a rationalization of D.
3Fisher (1972) has a characterization of preferences generating gross substitutes in the endowment
model, where substitutes is required to hold at all endowments.
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2.4 Discussion and remarks
The following observations are of interest:
1. Theorem 1 derives the testable implications of complementarity in the nominal
income model, D(p, I). With expenditure data (see e.g. Afriat (1967)), it should
be straightforward to verify Conditions 1 and 2 in the theorem.
2. The testable implications of complementarity in the endowment model are, by
Theorem 4, trivial: with Leontief preferences all observed consumption bundles
would lie on a continuous monotone path in consumption space.
3. Property 2 of Theorem 1 is a strengthening of the weak axiom of revealed preference
(see the discussion in the introduction).
4. In Theorem 4, we may without loss of generality normalize the real-valued fi to be
the identity function; this good then acts as a kind of endogenous “numeraire.”
5. A version of Theorem 4 holds for any number of goods. We present a proof for the
general n good case in Section 4. For the other results, we present a discussion of
the two-good assumption in the introduction.
Theorem 1 implies that a partial demand satisfying (1) and (2) is rationalizable by
a monotone increasing utility. One may want the rationalizing utility to be in addition
continuous, Example 1 shows that this would not be true.
Example 1. Consider the following utility
u(x1, x2) =
{
min(x1, x2), if min(x1, x2) < 1
x1 · x2, if x1, x2 ≥ 1.
So u behaves like a Leontief preference when min(x, y) < 1 and Cobb-Douglas otherwise.
In other words, if the consumer cannot afford to buy at least 1 from both products then
she buys the same amount from each product. Otherwise, she spends half of your money
on each product, making sure to buy at least 1 from each. The demand generated by
this preference relation is given by
D(px, py) =


(
1/(px + py), 1/(px + py)
)
, if px + py ≥ 1(
1/(2px), 1/(2py)
)
, if px, py ≤ 1/2(
1, (1− px)/py
)
, if py ≤ 1/2 and 1/2 ≤ px ≤ 1− py(
(1− py)/px, 1
)
, if px ≤ 1/2 and 1/2 ≤ py ≤ 1− px
and let D be the corresponding demand function. It is easy to verify that D is monotone.
So D is continuous by Lemma 6.15.
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However D cannot be rationalized by a continuous utility function. Indeed, assume
that v is a utility that rationalizes D. Then for every  > 0 we have v(1− , 3) < v(1, 1),
Since (1, 1) is revealed prefer to (1 − , 3): If p = (1 − η, η) for small enough η then
D(p) = (1, 1) and (1 − , 3) ∈ L(p). On the other hand v(1, 3) > v(1, 1) since (1, 3)
is revealed preferred to (1, 1): If p = (1/2, 1/6) then D(p) = (1, 3) and (1, 1) ∈ L(p).
Therefore v cannot be continuous.
It is interesting to note here that Richter (1971) and Hurwicz and Richter (1971)
present results on the existence of monotone increasing and continuous rationalizations,
but require the range of demand to be convex. Demand in our example has non-convex
range (see also the remark after Lemma 6.16).
Finally, discussions of complementarity are often centered around the elasticity of
substitution (Samuelson, 1974). In addition, Fisher (1972) presents a characterization
of the gross substitutes property in terms of elasticities. The following corollary to
Theorem 3 may be of interest.
Let D be differentiable, in addition to the hypotheses of Theorem 3. Let ηi(p, I) be
the own-price elasticity, and θi(p, I) be the cross elasticity, of demand for good i; i.e.
η1(p, I) =
∂D1(p, I)
∂p1
p1
D1(p, I)
θ1(p, I) =
∂D1(p, I)
∂p2
p2
D1(p, I)
.
Corollary 1. If D satisfies complementarity, then, for i = 1, 2,
ηi(p, I) + θi(p, I)
η1(p, I)η2(p, I)− θ1(p, i)θ2(p, i)
≤ −1.
Now, we consider the case of additive separability.
Corollary 2. Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied,and in addition, suppose
that u (x, y) = f (x) + g (y). Then complementarities is satisfied if and only if
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
≤ −
1
x
,
g′′ (x)
g′ (x)
≤ −
1
x
.
Therefore, an additively separable utility satisfies complementarity if and only if each
of its components are more concave than the natural logarithm. This result is essentially
in Wald (1951), for the case of gross substitutes (Varian (1985) clarifies this issue and
presents a different proof; the appendix to Quah (2007) has a proof for the the non-
differentiable case). For a function f : R+ −→ R, the number
−
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
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(a) Budget p: between A–A and B–B.
p′′
x
C C
p ∧ p′′
(b) Budget p′′: below C–C.
Figure 4: Implications of (x, p).
is often understood as a local measure of curvature at the point x. In particular, one
can demonstrate that for subjective expected utility, when u (x, y) = pi1U (x) + pi2U (y),
complementarity is satisfied if and only if the rate of relative risk aversion is greater than
one. It may be of interest to compare this with Quah’s (2003) result that the “law of
demand” is, in this case, equivalent to the rate of risk aversion never varying by more
than four.
We proceed in Section 3 with a heuristic argument for Theorem 1. We then proceed
with proofs of all three results.
3 A geometric intuition for Theorem 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on extending D, one price at a time, to a countable
dense subset of R2++. It turns out that the crucial step is to extend D from two prices to
a third price. Here we present a geometric version of the argument, for one of the special
cases we need to cover in the proof.
Fix two prices, p and p′′, with corresponding demands x = D(p) and x′′ = D(p′′).
Let p′ be a third price. We want to show that we can extend D to p′ while respecting
properties 1 and 2. We fix x as shown in Figure 4(a)
In Figure 4(a) we present the implications of x for demand x′ = D(p′), if x′ is to
satisfy the conditions in the theorem. Compliance with Property 1 requires demand to
be below the line A–A, as the intersection of A–A with the p′-budget line gives equality
in Property 1. Compliance with Property 2 requires demand to be to the left of B–B.
Hence, the possible x′ are in the bold interval on the p′ budget line.
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Figure 5: Compliance with x and any x′′ that complies with x.
Consider Figure 4(b), where we introduce prices p′′. Since x′′ and x satisfy properties 1
and 2, x′′ must lie below the line C–C on the p′′ budget line. We want to show that we
can choose an x′ that agrees with the implications of both p and p′′. In particular, that
any x′′ below C–C is compatible with a choice of x′ on the bold segment of the p′-budget
line.
In Figure 5, we represent the implications of x on x′′, and its indirect implications
on the demand at p′. To make the figure clearer, we do not represent the p′′ budget, but
we keep the C–C line: Note that the highest possible position of x′′ determines a point
on the p′ ∧ p′′-budget line, the point where C–C intersects the p′ ∧ p′′-budget line. This
point, in turn, determines a point on the p′-budget line, the point where the D–D line
intersects the p′ budget line; note that, were x′ to lie to the left of D–D, it would violate
Properties 1 with respect to x′′.
So, Property 1 applied to (x, p) and (x′′, p′′) requires that x′′ lies below the intersection
of C–C with the p′′-budget line. This implies that the position of demand on the p′-budget
line must lie to the right of the intersection with D–D. But this requirement is the same
as the compliance with Property 1 with respect to x: note that A–A and D–D intersect
p′ at the same point. So demand for p′ lies below A–A, as dictated by x if and only if
it lies to the right of D–D, as dictated by any x′′ that complies with Property 1 with
respect to x.
That D–D and A–A should coincide on the p′-budget line may seem curious at this
stage, but it is a result of the special case we are considering. Here, the budget set
of p′ is the meet of the budget sets corresponding to prices p ∧ p′ and p′ ∧ p′′; that is
p′ = (p ∧ p′) ∨ (p′ ∧ p′′). Let y and z be, respectively, the intersection of B–B with the
p∧p′ budget line, and of C–C with the p′∧p′′ line. Then, in the case we show in Figure 5,
y ∨ z coincides with y in the good that is cheaper for p′, and with z in the good that
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is cheaper in p′′. As a result, (p′ ∧ p′′) · (y ∨ z) = 1 says that expenditure on the two
cheapest goods adds to 1. But at the same time y ∧ z coincides with y in the good that
is more expensive for p, and similarly for z and p′′. So (p∧ p′′) · (y ∨ z) = 1 also says also
that the sum of expenditures on the two most expensive goods, when evaluated at prices
p ∨ p′′, must equal 1. Hence (p ∨ p′′) · (y ∧ z) = 1.
4 Proof of Theorem 4
We present the proof for n goods. For the purpose of this section, then, let Rn+ be
consumption space and Rn++ be the set of possible prices. A demand function is a
function D : Rn++ × R
n
+ → R
n
+ such that, for all (p, w) ∈ R
n
++ × R
n
+, p ·D (p, w) ≤ p · w.
We generalize the notion of complementarity and weak complementarity to the case
of n goods. We will say that demand D satisfies complementary if, for all i, j, for all
(p, w) , (p′, w′) for which w′ = w,
[Di (p
′, w′)−Di (p, w)] [Dj (p
′, w′)−Dj (p, w)] ≥ 0.
We say that D satisfies weak complementary if, or every (p, w) the set of prices p′
such that
[Di (p
′, w)−Di (p, w)] [Dj (p
′, w)−Dj (p, w)] ≥ 0 for every i, j (3)
has a nonempty interior
We shall prove the following:
Theorem 5. A rational demand function D satisfies weak complementarity if and only
if there exist continuous strictly monotone functions fi : R+ → R∪{∞} for which for
some i, fi (R+) ⊆ R (is always real-valued), so that
D (p, w) = arg max
B(p,w)
min
i=1,...,n
{fi (xi)} .
Let us first discuss a simple argument for the case in which complementarity (as
opposed to weak complementarity) is assumed. The argument holds for n goods. The
argument here is simpler than the argument for weak complementarity, and proceeds
by establishing that all price vectors have the same (strictly increasing and continuous)
Engel curves. The proof of the weak complementarity argument is more difficult and
works by characterizing weak upper contour sets of certain commodity bundles.
Define a function g : R+ → Rn+, and then prove that it is weakly increasing. Let 1
indicate a vector of ones, and define
g (α) = D ((1/n)1, α1) .
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Then g is a function specifying demand when total wealth is α, and prices are equal.
Moreover, it is clear by rationalizability (from Walras’ law) that
∑
i gi (α) = α. We
establish that g is weakly increasing, so that for all i, and all α < β, gi (α) ≤ gi (β).
To this end, suppose by means of contradiction that there exist α < β and i∗ for which
gi∗ (β) < gi∗ (α). As
∑
i gi (α) = α, there exists some j
∗ for which gj∗ (α) < gj∗ (β).
We will establish the existence of p∗ ∈ Rn++ such that p
∗ ·(g (β)− g (α)) = 0. Suppose
there does not exist such a p∗. Define
P = {p : p · (g (β)− g (α)) = 0} ;
the space of vectors orthogonal to (g (β)− g (α)). We know that P ∩ Rn++ = ∅. Hence,
there exists a hyperplane q ∈ Rn\ {0} for which for all p ∈ P , q · p ≥ 0 and for all
p ∈ Rn++, q · p ≤ 0. As P is a vector space, we may conclude that for all p ∈ P , q · p = 0.
Moreover, as Rn++ is open, we may conclude that for all p ∈ R
n
++, q · p < 0. In particular,
as q is orthogonal to the orthogonal subspace of (g (β)− g (α)), there exists some γ 6= 0
for which q = γ (g (β)− g (α)). Hence, we may conclude that either (g (β)− g (α)) ·p < 0
for all p ∈ Rn++ or (g (β)− g (α)) ·p > 0 for all p ∈ R
n
++. But this is clearly false, as there
exist i∗ for which gi∗ (β)− gi∗ (α) < 0 and j
∗ for which gi∗ (β)− gi∗ (α) > 0. Hence, there
exists such a p∗.
Now, B ((1/n)1, α1) = B ((1/n)1, g (α)), so that by rationalizability, D ((1/n)1, g (α)) =
g (α). Similarly, D ((1/n)1, g (β)) = β. Now, there does not exist x ∈ B (p∗, g (α)) for
which x ≥ g (α) and x 6= g (α). Hence, by rationality and complementarity, it follows
that D (p∗, g (α)) = g (α). Similarly, we may establish that D (p∗, g (β)) = g (β). But
note that B (p∗, g (α)) = B (p∗, g (β)). Hence g (α) = D (p∗, g (α)) = D (p∗, g (β)) =
g (β), a contradiction. Hence, α ≤ β implies g (α) ≤ g (β).
This latter fact in particular, along with the fact that
∑
i gi(α) = α, implies that
g is continuous (we establish that any monotonic demand function is continuous, see
Lemma 6.15). We establish that for any (p, w), D (p, w) = maxα {g (α) : g (α) ∈ D (p, w)}.
Let
x = max
α
{g (α) : g (α) ∈ D (p, w)} = g (α∗) .
This follows in a similar way to the preceding argument: For all p and all α one eas-
ily establishes that D (p, g (α)) = g (α) by complementarity and the preceding argu-
ment. As the maximum is attained (by continuity and the fact that g is unbounded),
as B (p, w) = B (p, g (α∗)), we conclude that D (p, w) = g (α∗), so that D (p, w) =
maxα {g (α) : g (α) ∈ D (p, w)}.
Recall that rationalizability implies the existence of a monotonic, continuous R ra-
tionalizing D.4 Define U (g (α)) ≡ {x : xRg (α)}. By monotonicity, Rn+ + {g (α)} ⊆
4For R, we denote the asymmetric part by P and the symmetric part by I.
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U (g (α)). Moreover, for any x /∈ Rn+ + {g (α)}, there exists some p ∈ R
n
++ for which
p · x ≤ p · g (α) (by a simple separating hyperplane argument) as x /∈ D (p, g (α)), we
may conclude that g (α) Px. Hence, x /∈ U (g (α)). Therefore, U (g (α)) = Rn+ + {g (α)}.
Therefore, by continuity, for all x ≥ g (α) for which x  g (α) is false, we conclude that
xIg (α). Therefore, for all α < β, it follows that g (α)  g (β); as otherwise, for all p,
g (α) maximizes R in B (p, g (β)), contradicting rationalizability.
We conclude that g is strictly increasing and continuous. It remains to define fi. But
gi is strictly increasing and continuous for all i, so simply define fi (x) = g
−1
i (x) on the
range of gi, and ∞ otherwise. Note that as
∑
i gi (α) = α, it follows that some gi must
be unbounded above; hence for some i, g−1i is well-defined and real-valued on all of R+.
It is now straightforward to verify that u (x) = mini {fi (xi)} generates D (p, w).
Now, we proceed with the argument for the weak complementarity case. The intuition
for the proof is quite simple. Consider a price-endowment pair, and the demand at that
pair. Without loss of generality, by rationality, we may assume that in fact, the demand
coincides with the endowment. Let us imagine the upper-contour set of utility at the
demand. We claim that there is a “kink” in this upper contour set at the demand
point. This follows because there exists some other price (at the same endowment) for
which demand of both commodities moves weakly in the same direction. But, since
endowment and demand coincide for the original price, in order for both commodities to
move weakly in the same direction, demand must remain unchanged. Hence there exist
two distinct prices for which demand coincides: there must therefore be a kink in the
indifference curve at this point. However, for any support point of the upper contour set,
the same property is satisfied. This tells us that every support point is actually a kink,
and therefore the upper contour set must coincide with a translation of the nonnegative
orthant: establishing that the rationalizing preference is generalized Leontief.
Say a set U is upper comprehensive if for all x ∈ U , {x} + Rn+ ⊆ U . Recall that the
support function h : Rn+ → R of a closed upper comprehensive set U ⊆ R
n is given by
h(p) = inf{p · x|x ∈ U}. (4)
The infimum is achieved for p ∈ Rn++, and the support function is continuous and concave
on this domain. A simple modification of Theorem 1.7.4 of Schneider (2003) establishes
that that the subgradient of h at p is given by
∂h(p) = conv
(
arg min
x∈U
p · x
)
(5)
for every p ∈ Rn++.
Before proving the theorem we prove the following lemmas (many are common knowl-
edge and appear in standard economics textbooks–we obviously make no claim to prior-
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ity). The set Uα = {x : u (x) ≥ α} for some α ∈ R is called an upper contour set of u at
α.
Lemma 4.1. Let u be a continuous function on Rn+, Uα an upper contour set of u and
p ∈ Rn++, and let w0 ∈ argminx∈Uαp · x. Then
u(w0) = α = max
B(p,w0)
u, and (6)
argminx∈Uαp · x = Uα ∩B(p, w0) = argmaxx∈B(p,w0)u(x). (7)
Proof. First, if x ∈ B(p, w0) and z < x then p · z < p · x ≤ p · w0 and therefore, since
w0 ∈ argminx∈Uαp · x, it follows that z /∈ Uα, i.e. u(z) < α. Since u is continuous
and this is true for every z < x it follows that u(x) ≤ α for every x ∈ B(p, w0). Thus
maxB(p,w0) u ≤ α. Since w0 ∈ B(p, w0) and u(w0) ≥ α (as w0 ∈ Uα) we get (6).
The left equality of (7) follows directly from the fact that w0 ∈ argminx∈Uαp · x, and
the right equality follows from the fact that maxB(p,w0) u = α.
When the utility function rationalizes a single-valued demand function we know that
argmaxB(p,w)u = D(p, w) is a singleton for every p, w. For an upper comprehensive set
U , we define the support function as h : R2++ → R given by
h (p) = inf
x∈U
p · x.
We get the following Corollary.
Corollary 3. Let D be a (single-valued) demand function which is rationalized by the
continuous and monotone utility function u and let U = Uα be an upper contour set of
u, and h the support function of Uα. Then:
1. ∂h(p) is a singleton for every p ∈ Rn++ (that is, h is differentiable at p).
2. ∂h(p) is the unique element w ∈ Rn such that u(w) = α and w = D(p, w).
Proof. Let w0 ∈ argminx∈Uαp · x. Then
argminx∈Uαp · x = argmaxB(p,w0)u = D(p, w0), (8)
where the first equality follows from (7) and the second from the definition of D. In
particular, argminx∈Uαp · x is a is a singleton, that is w0 = argminx∈Uαp · x. By (5) ∂h(p)
is also a singleton and ∂h(p) = argminx∈Uαp · x = w0. Moreover, it also follows from (8)
that w0 = D(p, w0) and from (6) that u(w0) = α.
Assume now that u(w) = α and w = D(p, w) for some w ∈ Rn++. We claim that
w = w0. Indeed, since w ∈ Uα and w0 = argminx∈Uαp · x it follows that p · w0 ≤ p · w.
In particular w0 ∈ B(p, w). But u(w0) = α = u(w) and by assumption w = D(p, w) =
argmaxB(p,w)u. Therefore w0 = w.
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Lemma 4.2. Assume that D is rationalized by u. Then p · D(p, w) = p · w for every
p ∈ Rn++ and w ∈ R
n
+.
Proof. By monotonicity of u the maximum in (1) is achieved on the boundary of B(p, w).
Since the the maximizer is by assumption unique the result follows.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that D is rationalized by the relation u. Then
D(p,D(p, w)) = D(p, w)
for every p ∈ Rn++ and w ∈ R
n
+.
Proof. The lemma follows from (1) and the fact that by the previous lemma B(p,D(p, w)) =
B(p, w).
Consequences of Weak Complementarity
The following lemma shows that weak complementarity, when applied to demand, is not
as innocuous as it appears.
Lemma 4.4. Assume that D satisfies rationalizability. Let w∗ = D(p, w) for some
p ∈ Rn++ and w ∈ R
n
+. Assume that, for some p
′ ∈ Rn++ (3), is satisfied with w = w
∗.
Then
D(p, w∗) = w∗ = D(p′, w∗).
Proof. Condition (3) means that either D(p′, w∗) ≥ D(p, w∗) or D(p′, w∗) ≤ D(p, w∗)
coordinate-wise. Assume, without loss of generality, the former. By Lemma 4.3 D(p, w∗) =
w∗, therefore
D(p′, w∗) ≥ w∗.
By Lemma 4.2
p′ ·D(p′, w∗) = p′ · w∗.
Since p′ ∈ Rn++ it follows from the last two equations that
D(p′, w∗) = w∗ = D(p, w∗).
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Proof of Theorem 4
Let U be an upper contour set of R and let h be its support function. Let p ∈ Rn++.
Then by Corollary 3 h is differentiable at p, ∂h(p) ∈ U and ∂h(p) = D(p, ∂h(p)).
We now claim that the derivative function p 7→ ∂h(p) is constant. Indeed, let p ∈ Rn++,
and let w∗ = ∂h(p). Then w∗ = D(p, w∗). By weak complementarity (via Lemma (4.4))
there exists an open set of p′ such that w∗ = D(p′, w∗). By the second item of Corollary 3,
∂h(p′) = w∗ for every such p′. In particular, every value in the image of p 7→ ∂h(p) is
achieved on a set with non-empty interior. From the separability of Rn++ it follows that
the image of the function p 7→ ∂h(p) is countable. Since the function p 7→ ∂h(p) is
continuous (as a derivative of a smooth concave function) it must be constant. Assume
that ∂h(p) = w0 for every p ∈ Rn++ for some w0 ∈ U . By definition of the subgradient, it
follows that p · w0 ≤ p · w for every w ∈ U and every p ∈ Rn++. By continuity, the later
inequality follows for every Rn+. Therefore w0 ≤ w for every w ∈ U . Since U is upper
comprehensive and w0 ∈ U we know that if w0 ≤ w then w ∈ U . Therefore U = w0+Rn++
is a translated orthant. The rest of the argument is the same as in the previous theorem.
5 Proof of Theorem 3
Fix xˆ in the interior of consumption space. Denote by ∇u (x) =
(
∂u(x)
∂x1
, ∂u(x)
∂x2
)
. Note that
xˆ = D (∇u (xˆ) ,∇u (xˆ) · xˆ) .
Let p = ∇u (xˆ). We calculate p′1 such that (xˆ1 + , xˆ2) lies on the budget line for (p
′
1, p2)
with income p · xˆ. So p′1(xˆ1 + ) + p2xˆ2 = p1xˆ1 + p2xˆ2. Conclude
p′1
p2
=
xˆ1
xˆ1 + 
m(xˆ).
The rest of the argument is illustrated in Figure 6. Since p′1 < p1, complementarity
implies that D(p′1, p2, I) lies weakly to the northwest of (xˆ1+, xˆ2) on the budget line. By
the strict convexity of u, u(y) > u(xˆ1 + , xˆ2) for any y that lies between D(p
′
1, p2, I) and
(xˆ1 + , xˆ2) on the budget line. Hence, if u does not achieve its maximum on the budget
line at (xˆ1 + , xˆ2), it is increasing as we move northwest on the budget line. So the
product ∇u · v, of the gradient of u with any vector pointing northwest, is nonnegative.
This gives m(xˆ1 + , xˆ2) ≤
p′
1
p2
, so
m(xˆ1 + , xˆ2) ≤
xˆ1
xˆ1 + 
m(xˆ).
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x1
x2
xˆ1 xˆ1 + 
xˆ2
Figure 6: Illustration for the proof of Theorem 3.
Since  > 0 was arbitrary, and since the two sides of the inequality are equal at  = 0,
we can differentiate with respect to  and evaluate at  = 0 to obtain
∂m(xˆ)
∂xˆ1
1
m(xˆ)
≤
−1
xˆ1
The proof of the second inequality is analogous.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
6.1 Preliminaries
For p ∈ R2++ let L(p) = {x ∈ R
2
+|p · x = 1}.
For x ∈ R let sgn(x) =


1, if x > 0
−1, if x < 0
0, if x = 0
.
The following lemmas are obvious.
Lemma 6.1. Let a, b, b′ ∈ R2+ such that a · b = a · b
′ = 1. Then
1. sgn(b1 − b
′
1) · sgn(b2 − b
′
2) ≤ 0.
2. If a  0 and b 6= b′ then sgn(b1 − b
′
1) · sgn(b2 − b
′
2) = −1.
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Lemma 6.2. Let a, b ∈ R2 such that a  0 and b > 0. Then a · b > 0.
Lemma 6.3. Let a, b, c ∈ R2 such that a  0. If a · b ≤ a · c and bi ≥ ci for i ∈ {1, 2}
then bj ≤ cj for j = 3− i.
For p ∈ R2++ and x ∈ R+ such that pjx ≤ 1 let Xi(p, x) = (1−pjx)/pi where j = 3−i.
Then Xi(p, x) is the i-th coordinate of the element of L(p) whose j-th coordinate is x.
Note that, when p, p′ ∈ R2++ and p · (xi, xj) = 1, Xi(p∧ p
′, xj) is well defined; this will be
a recurrent use of Xi in the sequel.
Lemma 6.4. Let p, p′ ∈ R2++ and x, x
′ ∈ R+ and i ∈ {1, 2} such that pjx, p′jx
′ ≤ 1, and
let j = 3− i. Then
1. piXi(p, x) ≤ 1 and x = Xj(p,Xi(p, x))
2. If p ≤ p′ then Xi(p, x
′) ≥ Xi(p
′, x′).
3. If x′ < x then Xi(p, x
′) > Xi(p, x)
Lemma 6.5. If p ∈ R2++ and x ∈ R
2
+, i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i. Assume that pjxj ≤ 1.
Then
1. p · x ≤ 1 iff xi ≤ Xi(p, xj).
2. p · x ≥ 1 iff xi ≥ Xi(p, xj)
Note that Statements 1 and 2 in Lemma 6.5 are not equivalent.
Lemma 6.6. Let p, q ∈ R2++ such that qi ≥ pi for some product i ∈ {1, 2}, and let
x, y ∈ L(p). If q · y ≥ 1 and xi ≥ yi then q · x ≥ 1.
Proof. Since xi ≥ yi and xi ≤ 1/pi (as xipi ≤ x·p = 1) it follows that xi = λyi+(1−λ)1/pi
for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Since y ∈ L(p), λy + (1 − λ)ei ∈ L(p), where ei ∈ R2++ is given by
eii = 1/pi and e
i
j = 0 for j = 3− i. Then, x = λy +(1−λ)e
i, as there is only one element
of L(p) with i-th component xi. Therefore
q · x ≥ min(q · y, q · ei) = min(q · y, qi/pi) ≥ 1,
as desired.
Lemma 6.7. Let p, q ∈ R2++ such that qi > pi for some product i ∈ {1, 2} and assume
that q · x ≤ 1 for some x ∈ L(p). Then pj ≥ qj for j = 3− i.
Proof. If pj < qj then q − p  0 and therefore
q · x− p · x = (q − p) · x > 0
By Lemma 6.2, but this is a contradiction since q · x ≤ p · x = 1.
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6.2 The conditions are necessary
We now prove that the conditions in Theorem 1 are necessary. Let D : R2++ → R
2
+ be
a decreasing demand function that satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference. Let
p, p′ ∈ R2++.
To prove that D satisfies Condition 1 note first that from the monotonicity of D it
follows that
D(p) ∨D(p′) ≤ D(p ∧ p′). (9)
Therefore
(p ∧ p′) · (D(p) ∨D(p′)) ≤ (p ∧ p′) ·D(p ∧ p′) = 1,
where the inequality follows from (9) and monotonicity of the scalar product in the second
argument.
To prove that D satisfies Condition 2 assume that p′ ·D(p) ≤ 1 and, say, that p′1 > p1.
We want to show that D(p′)2 ≥ D(p)2. Let p
′′ = 1
p′·D(p)
p′. Then p′ ≤ p′′ and p′′ ·D(p) = 1.
In particular, it follows from the last equality and the weak axiom of revealed preference
that p ·D(p′′) ≥ 1. Let x = D(p) and x′′ = D(p′′). Then p · x = p′′ · x′′ = p′′ · x = 1 and
p · x′′ ≥ 1. Therefore
0 ≥ p · x + p′′ · x′′ − p · x′′ − p′′ · x = (p− p′′) · (x− x′′) =
(p1 − p
′′
1) · (x1 − x
′′
1) + (p2 − p
′′
2) · (x2 − x
′′
2). (10)
Since p′′1 ≥ p
′
1 > p1 and p
′′ · x = p · x we get from Lemma 6.1 that p′′2 ≤ p2. Assume, by
way of contradiction, that x′′2 < x2. Then, since p
′′ ·x′′ = p′′ ·x and p′′  0 it follows from
Lemma 6.1 that x1 < x
′′
1, in which case the sum in the right hand side of (10) is strictly
positive (since p′′2 ≤ p2, p
′′
1 > p1,x
′′
2 < x2 and x1 < x
′′
1), which leads to a contradiction.
It follows that x′′2 ≥ x2, i.e. D(p
′′)2 ≥ D(p)2. By monotonicity of D it follows that
D(p′) ≥ D(p′′). Hence
D(p′)2 ≥ D(p
′′)2 > D(p)2,
as desired.
6.3 The conditions are sufficient
A data point is given by a pair (p, x) ∈ R2++ × R
2
+ such that p · x = 1.
Definition 1. A pair (p, x), (p′, x′) ∈ R2++ × R
2
+ of data points is permissible if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. (p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ x′) ≤ 1.
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2. If p′ · x ≤ 1 and p′i > pi for some product i ∈ {1, 2} then x
′
j ≥ xj for j = 3− i.
3. If p · x′ ≤ 1 and pi > p
′
i for some product i ∈ {1, 2} then xj ≥ x
′
j for j = 3− i.
Let us say that a partial demand function P : D → R2++ is permissible if (p,D(p)), (p
′, D(p′))
is a permissible pair for every p, p′ ∈ P Using this terminology, a partial demand function
D : P → R2++ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 iff it is permissible
Monotonicity is a consequence of permissibility:
Lemma 6.8. If (p, x), (p′, x′) ∈ R2++×R
2
+ is a permissible pair of data points and p ≤ p
′
then x′ ≤ x.
Proof. If p ≤ p′ then p ∧ p′ = p and therefore it follows from Condition 1 of Definition 1
that p · (x ∨ x′) ≤ 1. But p · x = 1 and therefore
p · (x ∨ x′ − x) = p · (x ∨ x′)− p · x ≤ 0.
Since x∨x′−x ≥ 0 it follows from the last inequality and Lemma 6.2 that x∨x′−x = 0,
i.e. x′ ≤ x, as desired.
The weak axiom of revealed preference is a consequence of permissibility:
Lemma 6.9. If (p, x), (p′, x′) ∈ R2++×R
2
+ is a permissible pair of data points and p
′·x < 1
then p · x′ > 1.
Proof. We show that p · x′ ≤ 1 implies p′ · x ≥ 1. Assume that p · x′ ≤ 1. If p′ ≥ p
then p′ · x ≥ p · x = 1 and we are done. Let p′  p. Assume w.l.o.g. that p1 > p′1. By
Condition 3 of Definition 1 it follows that x2 ≥ x
′
2. Also, since
(p− p′) · x′ = p · x′ − p′ · x′ ≤ 0
and since x′ > 0 it follows from Lemma 6.2 that it cannot be the case that p − p′ 
0. Therefore p2 ≤ p
′
2. Let x
′′ ∈ R2++ be such that x
′′
2 = x
′
2 and p · x
′′
2 = 1; that is
x′′ = (X1(p, x
′
2), x
′
2); note that X1(p, x
′
2) is well defined because p2x
′
2 ≤ p
′
2x
′
2 ≤ 1. Since
p ·x′ ≤ 1 = p ·x′′ and x′′2 = x
′
2 it follows from Lemma 6.3 that x
′′
1 ≥ x
′
1. Therefore x
′′ ≥ x′,
and, in particular, p′ · x′′ ≥ p′ · x′ ≥ 1. Since x2 ≥ x
′
2 = x
′′
2 and p2 ≤ p
′
2 it follows from
Lemma 6.6 that p′ · x ≥ 1 as desired.
The following lemma provides an equivalent characterization of permissible pairs.
Unlike the previous characterization, here the roles of p and p′ are not symmetric. For
fixed p and p′, the lemma states the restrictions on x′ (the demand at p′) such that the
pair (p, x), (p′, x′) is permissible assuming that x is already given. Recall Figure 4(a).
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From the lemma we see that every good induces one restriction on x′. If the good is
cheaper for p′ (as is the good that corresponds to the vertical axis in Figure 4(a)) then
it induces an inequality of type 1 – an upper bound on the demand for that good. This
is the line A–A in the figure. If the good is more expensive for p′ (as is the good that
corresponds to the horizontal axis in Figure 4(a)) then it induces an inequality of type 2
or 3, depending on whether x is a possible consumption at the new price p′. In the figure,
since x is not possible in the new price, we get an inequality of type 3 – an upper bound
on the demand for that product. This is the line B–B in the figure.
Lemma 6.10. A pair (p, x), (p′, x′) is permissible iff the following conditions are satisfied
for every product i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i.
1. If p′i ≤ pi then x
′
i ≤ Xi(p ∧ p
′, xj).
2. If p′i > pi and p
′ · x ≤ 1 then x′j ≥ xj.
3. If p′i > pi and p
′ · x > 1 then x′i ≤ xi.
The proof of Lemma 6.10 requires some auxiliary results, presented here as Claims 6.12, 6.11,
and 6.13.
Claim 6.11. If (p, x), (p′, x′) is a pair of data points and (p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ x′) ≤ 1 then
x′i ≤ Xi(p ∧ p
′, xj)
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i. Let y ∈ R2++ be such that yj = xj and yi = x
′
i. Then
(p ∧ p′) · y ≤ (p ∧ p′) · (x′ ∨ x) ≤ 1,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that y ≤ x′ ∨ x. In particular, it follows
from the last inequality and Lemma 6.5 that
x′i = yi ≤ Xi(p ∧ p
′, yj) = Xi(p ∧ p
′, xj),
as desired.
Claim 6.12. For every p, p′ ∈ R2++ and x ∈ L(p) the set of all x
′ ∈ L(p′) such that
(p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ x′) ≤ 1 is a subinterval of L(p′)
Proof. The function x′ 7→ (p∧p′) · (x∨x′) is concave since the inner product is monotone
and linear and since
x ∨
(
λα + (1− λ)β
)
≤ λ(x ∨ α) + (1− λ)(x ∨ β)
for every α, β ∈ R2++ and every 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
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Claim 6.13. If (p, x), (p′, x′) is a permissible pair such that x1 < x
′
1 and x2 > x
′
2 then
p1 > p
′
1 and p2 < p
′
2.
Proof. We show that any other possibility leads to a contradiction. Note first that
Lemma 6.8 implies x ≥ x′ if p ≤ p′, and x ≤ x′ if p ≥ p′. Both cases contradict
the hypotheses on x and x′.
Second, suppose that p1 < p
′
1 and p2 > p
′
2. Consider the following three cases.
• If p′ · x ≤ 1, then x′2 ≥ x2 by Condition 2 of Definition 1.
• If p · x′ ≤ 1, then x1 ≥ x
′
1 by Condition 3 of Definition 1.
• If p′ · x > 1 and p · x′ > 1 then
0 < p · x′ + p′ · x− p · x− p′ · x′ = (p− p′) · (x′ − x) =
(p1 − p
′
1) · (x
′
1 − x1) + (p2 − p
′
2) · (x
′
2 − x2) < 0
The first inequality follows from the fact that p · x = p′ · x′ = 1 and p · x′, p′ · x > 1.
The last inequality follows because, in each product, one multiplier is negative and
one is positive.
All three cases contradict the hypotheses on x and x′. The only possibility left is
p1 > p
′
1 and p2 < p
′
2, as desired.
We now prove Lemma 6.10
Proof. We consider separately the possible positions of p, p′, x, up to symmetry between
the products.
Case 1: p  p′. We show first that the conditions in the lemma imply permissibility.
Since p  p′ then p′ · x = p · x + (p′ − p) · x > 1 (the inequality follows from Lemma 6.2)
and, by Condition 3 in the lemma x′ ≤ x.
Since p ≤ p′, x′ ≤ x implies that (p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ x′) = p · x = 1. So Condition 1 in
the definition of permissibility is satisfied. In addition, x′ ≤ x implies that Condition 3
is satisfied. We show Condition 2: If p′ · x ≤ 1 and p′i > pi, then p · x = 1 implies that
x′i = xi = 0 and that p
′
j = pj for j = 3− i. Then x
′
2 = 1/p
′
2 = 1/p2 = x2. So Condition 2
is satisfied.
Now we show that permissibility implies the conditions in the lemma. Condition 1
in the lemma follows from Claim 6.11. Condition 3 holds because Lemma 6.8 implies
x′ ≤ x. Finally, Condition 2 follows from Condition 2 in the definition of permissibility.
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Case 2: p′ ≤ p. For each i, p′i ≤ pi. So x
′
i ≤ Xi(p
′, xj) by Condition 1 of the lemma,
as p′ = p′ ∧ p′. But x′i = Xi(p
′, x′j), so Xi(p
′, x′j) ≤ Xi(p
′, xj). Since Xi is monotone
decreasing in xj (item 3 of Lemma 6.4), xj ≤ x
′
j. This shows that x ≤ x
′. The rest of the
argument is analogous to the previous case.
Case 3: p1 < p
′
1, p2 > p
′
2 and p
′ · x ≤ 1. Let
A = {x′ ∈ L(p′)|x′2 ≥ x2, (p ∧ p
′) · (x ∨ x′) ≤ 1}.
Note that A is the set of all x′ such that the pair (p, x), (p′, x′) is permissible. Let
B = {x′ ∈ L(p′)|x′2 ≥ x2, x
′
2 ≤ X2(p ∧ p
′, x1)}
be the set of all x′ such that the pair (p, x), (p′, x′) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.10.
We have to prove that A = B. From Claim 6.11 we get that A ⊆ B. For the other
direction, note that the set B is the closed interval whose endpoints are the unique
points y, z in L(p′) such that y2 = x2 and z2 = X2(p ∧ p
′, x1). Since, by Claim 6.12, A is
an interval, it is sufficient to prove that y, z ∈ A.
Since p′ ·x ≤ 1 it follows that x1 ≤ y1 and therefore x ≤ y and x∨y = y and therefore
(p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ y) = (p ∧ p′) · y ≤ p′ · y = 1,
and thus y ∈ A.
Now,
z2 = X2(p ∧ p
′, x1) ≥ X2(p, x1) = x2 and
z1 = X1(p
′, z2) ≤ X1(p
′ ∧ p, z2) = X1(p
′ ∧ p,X2(p
′ ∧ p, x1)) = x1,
where the inequalities follow from item 2 of Lemma 6.4. It follows that x ∨ z = (x1, z2).
Since z2 = X2(p ∧ p
′, x1) it follows that (p ∧ p
′) · (x ∨ z) = 1 and therefore z ∈ A.
Case 4: p1 < p
′
1, p2 > p
′
2 and p
′ · x > 1. Note that, in this case, the conditions in the
lemma are equivalent to x′1 ≤ x1 and x
′
2 ≤ X2(p ∧ p
′, x1).
We show first that permissibility implies the latter conditions. We need to show that
x′1 ≤ x1, as Claim 6.11 gives x
′
2 ≤ X2(p ∧ p
′, x1). First, if p · x
′ ≤ 1 then by Condition 3
of the definition of permissibility x′1 ≤ x1. Second, let p · x
′  1. Then p′ · x > 1 and
p · x′ > 1 imply x′  x and x  x′. Now, x′1 > x1 and x
′
2 < x2 imply, by Claim 6.13 that
p′1 < p1 and p
′
2 > p2. So it must be that x
′
1 < x1 and x
′
2 > x2. Thus, either way we get
that x′1 ≤ x1.
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We now show that the conditions imply permissibility. Let y = (x1, X2(p ∧ p
′, x1));
so (p ∧ p′) · y = 1. Note that x2 = X2(p, x1) ≤ X2(p ∧ p
′, x1), so x ≤ y. The conditions
are equivalent to x′ ≤ y. So we obtain
(p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ x′) ≤ (p ∧ p′) · (x ∨ y) ≤ (p ∧ p′) · y = 1.
Thus Condition 1 of the definition of permissibility is satisfied. Condition 2 in the
definition follows from Condition 2 in the lemma. Finally, Condition 3 in the definition
is satisfied since x′1 ≤ x1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 6.14. Let P be a finite subset of R2++ and let D : P → R
2
+ be a permissible
partial demand function. Let p′ ∈ R2++. Then D can be extended to a permissible partial
demand function over P ∪ {p′}.
Proof. For p ∈ P and x = D(p) let A(p) be the set of all x′ ∈ L(p′) such that the
pair (p, x), (p′, x′) is permissible. We have to prove that
⋂
p∈P A(p) is nonempty. From
Lemma 6.10, A(p) is a sub-interval of L(p′). It is then sufficient to show that for any
pa and pb in P , A(pa) ∩ A(pb) 6= ∅, as any collection of pairwise-intersecting intervals
has nonempty intersection (an easy consequence of Helly’s Theorem, for example see
Rockafellar (2006), Corollary 21.3.2).
Thus we fix pa and pb in P . From Lemma 6.10, A(pa) and A(pb) are defined by a set
of inequalities, one inequality for each product. We have to show that the intersection
of the solution sets for these inequalities is nonempty. Note that two inequalities that
correspond to the same products are always simultaneously satisfiable.
Case 1: p′1 ≤ p
a
1 and p
′
2 ≤ p
b
2. Let y ∈ R
2
++ be given by y1 = X1(p
a ∧ p′, xa2) and
y2 = X2(p
b∧p′, xb1). We have to prove that L(p
′)∩{x′|x′ ≤ y} is nonempty, or equivalently
that p′ · y ≥ 1. Indeed,
p′ · y = p′1 · y1 + p
′
2 · y2
= (p′1 ∧ p
a
1) · y1 + (p
′
2 ∧ p
b
2) · y2
= 2−
∑
(i,j)∈{(a,2),(b,1)}
(p′j ∧ p
i
j) · x
i
j
≥ 2−
∑
(i,j)∈{(a,2),(b,1)}
(pjj ∧ p
i
j) · (x
i
j ∨ x
j
j)
= 2− (pa ∧ pb) · (xa ∨ xb)
≥ 1.
The second equality above follows from the fact that p′1 ≤ p
a
1 and p
′
2 ≤ p
b
2. The third
equality follows from the fact that (y1, x
a
2) ∈ L(p
′∧pa), so (p′1∧p
a
1) ·y1 = 1− (p
′
2∧p
a
2) ·x
a
2,
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and similarly for (xb1, y2). The first inequality is because p
′
1 ≤ p
a
1 and p
′
2 ≤ p
b
2. The last
inequality is because (pa, xa), (pb, xb) is permissible.
Case 2: p′1 > p
a
1 and p
′ · xa ≤ 1, while p′2 > p
b
2 and p
′ · xb ≤ 1. Let y = (xb1, x
a
2). We have
to prove that L(p′)∩ {x′|x′ ≥ y} is nonempty. Or, equivalently, that p′ · y ≤ 1. If y ≤ xa
or y ≤ xb then we are done. Suppose then that y  xa and y  xb; hence that xa2 > x
b
2
and xb1 > x
a
1. In this case it follows from Claim 6.13 that p
a
1 > p
b
1 and p
a
2 < p
b
2. Since we
assumed that p′2 > p
b
2 it follows that p
′
2 > p
a
2. Since we assumed that p
′
1 > p
a
1 it follows
that p′  pa, which contradicts p′ · xa ≤ 1 (since pa · xa = 1).
Case 3: p′1 > p
a
1 and p
′ · xa > 1, while p′2 > p
b
2 and p
′ · xb > 1. Let y = (xa1, x
b
2). We
prove that L(p′) ∩ {x′|x′ ≤ y} is nonempty. Or, equivalently, that p′ · y ≥ 1. If y ≥ xa
or y ≥ xb then we are done. Suppose then that y  xa and y  xb, so that xa2 > x
b
2 and
xb1 > x
a
1. In this case it follows from Claim 6.13 that p
a
1 > p
b
1 and p
a
2 < p
b
2. Therefore
pa ∧ pb = (pb1, p
a
2) and x
a ∨ xb = (xb1, x
a
2). It follows that
p′ · y = p′1 · y1 + p
′
2 · y2 ≥ p
a
1 · x
a
1 + p
b
2 · x
b
2 =
2− pb1 · x
b
1 − p
a
2 · x
a
2 = 2− (p
a ∧ pb) · (xa ∨ xb) ≥ 1,
The first inequality follows from the assumption that p′1 > p
a
1 and p
′
2 > p
b
2. The second
equality follows from pi · xi = 1, i = a, b. The last inequality follows from permissibility
(Condition 1 in Definition 1).
Case 4: p′1 ≤ p
a
1 and p
′
2 > p
b
2 and p
′ · xb ≤ 1. Note first that Lemma 6.7 implies p′1 ≤ p
b
1.
We need there to exist x′ ∈ L(p′) with x′1 ≤ X1(p
a∧p′, xa2) and x
′
1 ≥ x
b
1. That is, we need
xb1 ≤ X1(p
a ∧ p′, xa2). Or, equivalently, that (p
a ∧ p′) · y ≤ 1 where y = (xb1, x
a
2). If y ≤ x
a
then (pa ∧ p′) · y ≤ pa · xa = 1. If y ≤ xb then (pa ∧ p′) · y ≤ p′ · xb ≤ 1. The only other
possibility is that y > xa and y > xb, so that xa2 > x
b
2 and x
b
1 > x
a
1. In this case it follows
in particular from Claim 6.13 that pa2 < p
b
2. Now, p
′
1 ≤ p
b
1 implies that p
a ∧ p′ ≤ pb and
therefore pa ∧ p′ ≤ pa ∧ pb. In addition, in this case, y = xa ∨ xb. Therefore
(pa ∧ p′) · y ≤ (pa ∧ pb) · (xa ∨ xb) ≤ 1
the last inequality follows from Condition 1 in Definition 1
Case 5: p′1 ≤ p
a
1 and p
′
2 > p
b
2 and p
′ · xb > 1. Let y1 = X1(p
a ∧ p′, xa2) and y2 = x
b
2.
We have to prove that the set L(p′) ∩ {x′|x′ ≤ y} is nonempty, or equivalently that
p′ · y ≥ 1. If xa1 ≥ x
b
1 then y ≥ x
b (since y1 = X1(p
a ∧ p′, xa2) ≥ X1(p
a, xa2) = x
a
1) and, in
particular, p′ · y ≥ p′ · xb ≥ 1. If xb2 ≥ x
a
2 then y2 ≥ X2(p
a ∧ p′, y1) (Since, by Lemma 6.4,
X2(p
a ∧ p′, y1) = x
a
2) and therefore p
′ · y ≥ (pa ∧ p′) · y ≥ 1. The only other possibility
is that xa2 > x
b
2 and x
b
1 > x
a
1. In this case it follows from Claim 6.13 that p
a
2 < p
b
2 and
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pa1 > p
b
1. So p
a ∧ pb = (pb1, p
a
2), and, since p
′
2 > p
b
2, p
′
2 > p
a
2. Now,
p′ · y ≥ (p′1, p
b
2) · (y1, y2) =
(pb1, p
b
2) · (x
b
1, y2) + (p
′
1, p
a
2) · (y1, x
a
2)− (p
b
1, p
a
2) · (x
b
1, x
a
2) ≥ 1.
Where the last inequality follows from the following observations:
(pb1, p
b
2) · (x
b
1, y2) = p
b · xb = 1.
(p′1, p
a
2) · (y1, x
a
2) = (p
a ∧ p′) · (y1, x
a
2) = 1 since y1 = X1(p
a ∧ p′, xa2).
(pb1, p
a
2) · (x
b
1, x
a
2) = (p
a ∧ pb) · (xa ∨ xb) ≤ 1
The last equality follows from (pb1, p
a
2) = (p
a∧pb), as we established above. The inequality
follows from permissibility.
Case 6: p′1 > p
a
1 and p
′ · xa ≤ 1 and p′2 > p
b
2 and p
′ · xb > 1. We have to prove that
xa2 ≤ x
b
2. Indeed, from Lemma 6.7 it follows that p
′
2 ≤ p
a
2. Thus p
a
2 > p
b
2. If p
a · xb > 1
then by Condition 3 of Lemma 6.10 xa2 ≤ x
b
2, as desired. If p
a ·xb < 1 then, since pa2 > p
b
2,
it follows from Condition 2 of Definition 1 that xa1 ≥ x
b
1. Since p
′ · xa ≤ 1 < p′ · xb it
follows from Lemma 6.3 that xa2 ≤ x
b
2, as desired.
Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem 1. Let P be a finite subset of R2++ and let
D : P → R2+ be a partial demand function that satisfies the conditions of the theorem,
i.e. such that the pair (p,D(p)), (p′, D(p′)) is permissible for every p, p′ ∈ P . Let Q be
a countable dense subset of R2++ that contains P . By Lemma 6.14, D can be extended
to a function D : Q → R2+ such that for every p, p
′ ∈ Q the pair (p,D(p)), (p′, D(p′)) is
permissible.
In particular, by Lemma 6.8, D is monotone on Q. Extend D to R2++ by defining
D˜(p) =
∧
q∈Q,q≤p D(q) for every p ∈ R
2
++. Since D is monotone, it follows that D˜(p) =
D(p) for p ∈ Q and that D˜ is monotone. Since p · D(p) = 1 for p ∈ Q it follows that
p · D˜(p) = 1 for p ∈ R2++. That is, for all q ∈ Q, q ≤ p, q · D˜(p) ≤ q ·D (q) = 1, so that
in the limit, p · D˜(p) ≤ 1. If, in fact, p · D˜(p) < 1, then there exists q ∈ Q, q ≤ p such
that p ·D (q) < 1; from which we conclude that q ·D (q) ≤ q ·D (p) < 1, a contradiction.
.Therefore, p · D˜(p) = 1.
Now, by Lemma 6.15, D˜ is continuous.
Lemma 6.15. If a demand function satisfies complementarity, then it is continuous.
Proof. Let p∗ ∈ R2++ and {p
n}∞n=1 ⊆ R
2
++ such that p
n → p∗. First consider the case
in which for all n, pn ≤ p∗. In particular, for all n, D (pn) ≥ D (p∗). Let ε > 0;
we wish to show that there exists some N such that for all i = 1, 2, n ≥ N implies
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Di (p
n) < Di (p
∗)+ ε. Suppose that there exists no such N and without loss of generality
suppose that D1 (p
nk) > D1 (p
∗) + ε for some subsequence. The equality pnk1 D1 (p
nk) +
pnk2 D2 (p
nk) = 1 implies that
D2(p
∗) ≤ D2 (p
nk) =
1− pnk1 D1 (p
nk)
pnk2
<
1− pnk1 (D1 (p
∗) + ε)
pnk2
.
Hence, in the limit we have
D2 (p
∗) ≤
1− p∗1 (D1 (p
∗) + ε)
p∗2
.
But then
p∗1D1(p
∗) + p∗2D2(p
∗) ≤ 1− p∗1ε < 1,
contradicting that D is a demand function.
A similar argument holds for pn ≥ p∗.
Now suppose that pn is arbitrary. By monotonicity, we have
D (p∗ ∨ pn) ≤ D (pn) ≤ D (p∗ ∧ pn) ,
and as p∗ ∨ pn → p∗ and p∗ ∧ pn → p∗, we conclude that D (pn) → D (p∗).
It remains to show that D˜ is rationalizable by a monotone increasing utility. We first
establish that D˜ satisfies the weak axiom. So, suppose by means of contradiction that
there exists p, p′ such that p·D˜ (p′) < 1 and p′ ·D˜ (p) ≤ 1. By monotonicity and continuity
of D˜, we may therefore find q ∈ Q, q  p′ such that p · D˜ (q) < 1 and q · D˜ (p) < 1.
By continuity, there exists q′ ∈ Q such that q′ · D˜ (q) < 1 and q · D˜ (q′) < 1. However,
Lemma 6.9 implies that D˜ satisfies the axiom on Q, a contradiction. The result then
follows from Lemma 6.16
Lemma 6.16. A continuous demand function satisfying the weak axiom of revealed pref-
erence is rationalizable by an upper semicontinuous, monotone increasing, utility.
Remark. Lemma 6.16 is related to Theorem 12 in Richter (1971) and Theorem 1 in Hur-
wicz and Richter (1971). Both results require a convex-range assumption. In addition,
the monotonicity and upper-semicontinuity hold on the range of demand, not necessarily
on consumption space. Richter (1971) obtains a strictly increasing utility on the range
of demand. We obtain a utility such that x  y implies u(x) > u(y) and x ≥ y im-
plies u (x) ≥ u (y). Note that the demand function D(p1, p2) =
(
1/(p1 +p2), 1/(p1 +p2)
)
,
which is rationalized by u(x1, x2) = min(x1, x2), admits no utility function that is strictly
monotone over R2. On the role of convex range, see our Example 1.
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Proof. Let R be the revealed preference binary relation on R2+, so x R y if there is a p
with x = D(p) and p · y ≤ 1. The weak axiom with two commodities implies that Rτ is
acyclic (the strong axiom). Let Rτ be the transitive closure of R; . Then Rτ is a strict
partial order.
Let x, x′ ∈ Y with xT x′. We claim that there exists z ∈ D(Q2++) and a neighborhood
U of x′ such that xRz and zRy for every y ∈ U . In particular, this will demonstrate two
facts. Firstly, there exists a countable Rτ -dense set, and secondly, that Rτ is an upper
semicontinuous binary relation.
Suppose first that p ·x′ < 1. Then there exists q ∈ Q2++ with p ≤ q and q ·x
′ < 1. Let
z = D(q) and U be a neighborhood of x′ such that q · y < 1 for every y ∈ U . It follows
that z R y for every y ∈ U . Moreover, as p ≤ q and q · z = 1, x R z.
Secondly, suppose that p · x′ = 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that x1 < x
′
1
and x′2 < x2. Choose w = (1/2)x + (1/2)x
′, so x,w, x′ ∈ L(p). Let δ > 0 be such that
Bδ(x) ∩ Bδ(w) = ∅, where Bδ(x) denotes the open ball of radius δ and center x. For all
q1 < p1, let pˆ2(q1) = (1/w2)(1− q1w1) (Note that w2 > 0 since w2 > x
′
2 ≥ 0). So pˆ2(q1) >
p2 and w is the intersection of L(p) and L(q1, pˆ2(q1)). Note that if z ∈ L(q1, pˆ2(q1)) and
z1 < w1 then p ·z < 1 and if z ∈ L(p) with w1 < z1 then (q1, pˆ2(q1)) ·z < 1. Since demand
is continuous, and x = D(p), there exists  > 0 such that p˜ ∈ B(p) implies D(p˜) ∈ Bδ(x).
Fix q1 ∈ Q, q1 > p1, such that (q1, pˆ2(q1)) ∈ B(p). Note that by the choice of δ, and
since D(q1, pˆ2(q1)) ∈ Bδ(x), we have that D(q1, pˆ2(q1)) < w1. So p · D(q1, pˆ2(q1)) < 1.
Similarly, (q1, pˆ2(q1)) ·x
′ < 1. Using continuity of demand again, there is a q2 ∈ Q++ close
enough to pˆ2(q1) such that p ·D(q1, q2) < 1 and (q1, q2) ·x
′ < 1. Let U be a neighborhood
of x′ such that (q1, q2) · y < 1 for every y ∈ U . Set z = D(q1, q2). Then x R z R y for
every y ∈ U , as desired.
Therefore Rτ is a partial strict order over R2++ admitting a countably dense set
(namely D(Q2++)) and such that the lower contour sets are open. By Peleg (1970)
5
there exists an upper semi continuous function u : R2++ → R that rationalizes R
τ . Let
v(x) = max{u(y)|y ∈ R2++ and y ≤ x} (note that the maximum is achieved since u is
upper semi continuous). Then v is monotone and also rationalizes Rτ .
It remains to show that v is upper semi continuous. Let α ∈ R and consider the
lower contour set V = {x ∈ R2++|v(x) < α}. We have to show that V is open. Indeed,
let x ∈ V , and let B = {y ∈ R2++|y ≤ x} and U = {x ∈ R
2
++|u(x) < α}. Then
B ⊆ U by definition of v, and, moreover, B is compact and U is open (since u is
5Peleg also assumes a condition on the order that he terms spaciousness. Spaciousness is used
to guarantee that the utility representation is continuous; but the rest of his theorem guarantees the
existence of an upper semicontinuous binary relation as we have here. See also Rader (1963) and Jaffray
(1975).
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upper semi-continuous). Therefore there exists some  > 0 such that B+ ⊆ U where
B+ = {z ∈ R2++|∃x ∈ B ‖x− z‖∞ < } (here  is the ‖‖∞-distance between the compact
set B and the closed set U c). Let z ∈ R2++ be such that ‖z − x‖∞ < . Then y ∈ B+
for every y ≤ z and therefore u(y) < α for every such y. It follows that v(z) < α. This
proves that V is open.
Remark. Theorem 2 follows from lemmas 6.15 and 6.16.
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